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           ‘Equality, Pluralism, Universality: Current Concerns in Normative Theory’   
  
 
  Normative theory flourishes best when there is no normative consensus; it is when we disagree 
about the principles by which we should live our lives that we most feel compelled to debate 
them. It may seem odd, then, that normative theory is currently in such a healthy condition, for 
this is supposed to be precisely such an age of consensus. Liberalism has gained an 
unprecedented ascendancy over socialism, old-style egalitarianism has fallen from favour, 
politicians jostle for the middle ground. With so many of the traditional oppositions  - left versus 
right, direct versus representative democracy, equality versus difference - called into question, 
this hardly seems a good time for normative theory. 
 In this highly instrumental age  (when all research has to be tested by its relevance to 
‘user-groups’) one might also anticipate a reluctance among political theorists to describe what 
they do as normative theory. The category conjures up distinctions between ‘is’ and ‘ought’, 
descriptive and prescriptive; in doing so, it threatens to give too much credibility to the 
objectivity claims of political scientists while banishing to the periphery those otherworldly 
figures who write about equality, freedom, or justice. No one likes to think of herself as engaged 
in what John Dunn (1996, p30) has described as the ‘emotionally self-indulgent recycling of 
cherished political pieties’; and in an era much exercised by what is possible and viable, no one 
wants to be regarded as out of touch with practical concerns. Nowadays, normative theory also 
evokes images of the complacent ideologue who mistakes local preference for universal truth, 
who bossily intervenes to tell others what is right and wrong and fails to register the great variety 
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of ethical traditions. As we become more conscious of the ethno-centricity that shapes 
everyone’s values and ideals, we are less likely to relish the description.  
 And yet normative theory carries on apace, with continuing work on issues of equality, justice 
and freedom, elaborations of older traditions such as civic republicanism, and an explosion of 
new literature on what are seen as the challenges of diversity and difference. This is not as 
contradictory as it seems, for as theorists free themselves from some of the earlier ideological 
stand-offs, they may be able to develop innovative arguments that bridge what used to be 
regarded as opposing camps. Rawls, most famously, developed a case for economic 
redistribution that many socialists were happy to endorse (he argued that inequalities were 
justified only when they could be shown to benefit the least advantaged), but he did this from 
within a self-consciously liberal framework. In Real Freedom for All, Philippe Van Parijs 
(1995) builds a socialist case for paying all members of a society an unconditional basic income, 
and does this on the basis of an argument about individual freedom. In a series of essays recently 
collected under the title Democracy and Human Rights, David Beetham (1999) argues that the 
process of democratic reform is not assisted by debating whether one is ‘for’ or ‘against’ liberal 
democracy or elaborating what one conceives to be fundamentally different conceptions of 
democracy. Developing an immanent rather than external critique of liberal democracy, he 
focuses on the core principles of political equality and popular control that underpin any 
conception of democracy, and is impatient with antitheses between direct and representative, 
majoritarian and consensual, mass and deliberative democracy that have (in his view) hampered 
previous debate.  
 This sense of liberation from previous dichotomies is also apparent in recent recuperations of 
republican thought. For much of the post-war period, theorists were required to attach 
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themselves to either a negative or positive concept of liberty. The first (presumed to be the 
liberal one) defined freedom as the opposite of coercion, as not being prevented by others from 
doing what we want to do. The second (associated with socialism, and putatively with totalitarian 
patterns of thought) linked freedom to self-realisation, took freedom to be possible only under 
specific social conditions, and suggested that alienated individuals might not be the best judges 
of whether they were ‘really’ free. The 1970s gloss on this pitted a liberal-individualist 
conception of freedom as the capacity to do what one chose in one’s private life against a more 
public understanding of freedom as participation in political affairs. In recent years, both these 
oppositions have been redrawn.  Philip Pettit’s Republicanism (1996) delivers a ‘third way’ 
that looks more kindly on the interventionist state as necessary to secure citizens against the 
domination of violent husbands or unscrupulous employers, but stops short of what he regards as 
the utopianism of participatory democracy. Quentin Skinner (1998) employs the ‘neo-roman’ 
theory of liberty to cut through the negative/positive dichotomy, elaborating an understanding of 
individual freedom as crucially dependent on being a free citizen in a free state. Whether these 
moves really do establish a third alternative remains a moot point, but the intention at least is 
clear. Instead of battling on with what are perceived as arid oppositions between liberalism and 
socialism, contemporary theorists suggest ways of identifying inadequacies in liberalism or 
liberal democracy that do not require us to junk the tradition wholesale. 
 G.A.Cohen’s work is, on the face of it, an exception to this trend, for Cohen continues to 
place himself firmly on the socialist side of any liberal/socialist divide. But Cohen, too, has 
undergone major transformation. In a fascinating introduction to Self-Ownership, Freedom and 
Equality, he reflects on his earlier disinclination to do normative philosophy. Marxism, as he 
then construed it, was an empirical theory about the structure of society and dynamics of history; 
 5 
while the kind of theorising that involved assessing the validity of judgements on equality or 
justice seemed all too obvious to take up much of his time. (‘I had never heard an argument 
against socialism for which I did not  (so I thought) already have an answer in my pocket.’ 
(1995,p4)
 
 But as the historical facts that were supposed to guarantee the transition to socialism 
developed a rather different trajectory, and the challenge to egalitarianism – especially from 
theorists like Robert Nozick - posed problems he could not so readily answer, Cohen found 
himself almost entirely engaged by normative questions. ‘In the past, there seemed to be no need 
to argue for the desirability of an egalitarian socialist society. Now I do little else.’ (p7) 
The description suggests he has little expectation of being forced to revise his normative 
positions (the task being to answer the difficult objections and strengthen the socialist case), and 
while this captures the spirit of moral advocacy that has become crucial to his work, it 
understates significant developments in his analysis of both Marxism and egalitarianism. Cohen 
has been far more troubled by libertarian justifications of inequality than many of his more 
liberal colleagues; and in the process of dealing with these arguments, has incorporated into his 
understanding of egalitarianism what were previously considered right-wing arguments about 
responsibility and choice. Left egalitarians, in his view, should be focusing their attention on the 
unacceptable inequalities that arise out of exploitation and undeserved ‘bad luck’. They should 
be willing to differentiate these from the ‘acceptable’ inequalities or disadvantages that arise out 
of the exercise of personal choice.  
In this changed landscape, there are two sets of issues I want to address. The first relates to 
the shifting analyses of equality. Equality is not a particularly fashionable topic in contemporary 
politics, but has by no means dropped out of the normative literature. Work on equality has, 
however, bifurcated in a startling way, with most of the writing on economic equality focusing 
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on the principles that should regulate the distribution of goods between individuals, and most of 
the writing on social equality addressing patterns of oppression that regulate the relationship 
between marginal and dominant groups. The literature on economic equality takes issue with the 
complacencies of market allocations, and is far more challenging in its conception of equality 
than the post-Thatcher consensus among party politicians; but it treats inequality primarily as a 
matter of unfair distribution between individuals, and has become preoccupied with the 
distinction between justified and unjustified inequalities. The literature on social or cultural 
equality (sometimes referred to as ‘the politics of difference’ or ‘the politics of recognition’) has 
been more concerned with inequities between groups: the persistent devaluing of people by 
virtue of their race, gender or sexuality; the failures of equal citizenship in what are now 
multicultural and multi-ethnic societies; the assimilationist impositions that force all social 
groups into the self-same mould. If the first literature sometimes appears astonishingly 
indifferent to the group nature of contemporary inequality, the second often mirrors this failing 
by its lack of interest in the distribution of economic resources. The two then seem to talk past 
one another.  
The second set of issues relates to the very status of normative theory. Contemporary 
theorists are usually well aware of what Shane O’Neill (MacKenzie and O’Neill,1999, p9) 
describes as contingency: ‘the fact that the main social resources that we might draw on as critics 
are the chance products of time and circumstance’.  The values we affirm are inevitably formed 
within particular social contexts, and while we may be able to establish a universally valid 
justification that detaches these from their contingent origins, we also know how easy it is to fool 
ourselves into thinking we have carried this off.  This problem becomes particularly pressing in 
the context of a self-evident cultural pluralism, when global migration combines with global 
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communication to expose the latent ethno-centricity of much normative thinking. While 
liberalism is one sense triumphant, it is in other ways on the defensive, and a more jaundiced 
take on the values of the Enlightenment (eg Gray, 1995) has generated much soul-searching 
about the values political theorists proclaim. What then of claims to moral universalism? What is 
the status of normative theory? 
I. Equality: Individuals or Groups? 
Over the last twenty years, egalitarians have mostly followed Cohen’s recommendation about 
taking choice and responsibility more seriously, and the majority of  those writing on economic 
equality (eg Dworkin, 1981a, 1981b; Nagel ,1979, 1991; Arneson, 1997; Miller, 1990,1995) now 
work within a framework that seeks to distinguish between the acceptable and unacceptable 
inequalities. The defining question becomes ‘what do individuals deserve?’, the presumption 
being that we answer this question by establishing what was chosen and what was arbitrarily 
imposed. Is it fair, we then ask, that one individual should be so much poorer than another when 
she was born, through no fault of her own, with a physical or mental disability? Is it fair that one 
individual should live in more reduced circumstances than another because he was born - also 
through no fault of his own - on the wrong side of the tracks? Is it fair that the individual who 
inherits a powerful physique, an exquisite voice, or an extraordinary capacity for computing 
should be able to earn so much more than the individual born with no very discernible talents? Is 
it fair (to take the somewhat more structural question posed by Cohen in his 1991 work on 
incentives) that talented rich people should hold the rest of us to ransom by threatening to work 
less if tax rates rise?  
The questions hark back to an argument developed by Rawls (1971) about the arbitrariness 
of birth, and the moral incoherence of saying that people deserve the fruits of what came to them 
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through no intrinsic merit of their own. Egalitarians have always been conscious of the injustices 
associated with social class, and the unfair consequences of family background on people’s 
development through future life. The novelty in contemporary work is that egalitarians also 
question the injustices associated with natural talent, with ability and talent increasingly seen as 
just a matter of good luck in the natural lottery. We surely cannot say that individuals ‘deserve’ 
those goods that come to them through their chance location in an existing social hierarchy: the 
wealth they inherited from their parents; the educational advantages they derive from access to 
private schooling; the political influence they achieve through mixing in the right social class. 
But if this is so, we also cannot say they deserve those goods that come to them by virtue of their 
‘natural’ talents: their greater capacity for intellectual labour; their unusual gift for dreaming up 
new inventions; their greater stamina or strength. ‘Brute-luck’ hardly counts as a justification for 
inequality. Where inequality can be justified, it must be through the choices we make.  
The radicalism in this is self-evident: the world we live in would be profoundly different if 
the wealth of the rich derived only from activities for which they could claim to have been 
personally responsible, and if those disadvantaged in the natural lottery were compensated for 
their relative misfortune. But as the argument has evolved, it has focused attention more and 
more on distinctions between what is deserved and undeserved, and the emphasis on individual 
responsibility has had a number of unfortunate effects. The first is that the separation between 
legitimate and illegitimate inequalities generates a rather punitive frame of mind, somewhat akin 
to Victorian distinctions between the deserving and undeserving poor. Contemporary egalitarians 
will typically say that the distribution of resources should not reflect the chance differences of 
birth, but think it entirely right and proper that the distribution should reflect the different choices 
people make in their lives. What then of those who make bad decisions, the short termers, for 
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example, who had the same chances as others to insure themselves against future illness or 
poverty but opted for immediate enjoyments instead? Needs do not go away just because the 
needy made mistakes, yet the preoccupation with distinguishing deserved from undeserved 
misfortune can anaesthetise us to what now appears  ‘justified’ suffering. Since most of the 
undeserved misfortunes will also remain in place (no one really imagines that society is going to 
impose a 100% inheritance tax or come up with a rewards structure that will eliminate the 
advantages accruing to ability and talent), we may then end up with the worst of both worlds: not 
much modification of the natural lottery, but a new toughness towards irresponsible individuals 
who must now live with the consequences of their mistakes.  
A second problem is that in seeking to compensate individuals for their undeserved  bad 
fortune, egalitarians inadvertently reinforce notions about some individuals being superior to 
others. In her recent critique of luck egalitarianism, Elizabeth Anderson argues that the focus on 
‘brute’ bad luck as one of the main injustices to be eliminated ‘disparages the internally 
disadvantaged and raises private disdain to the status of officially recognized truth’ (Anderson, 
1999, p306). So some are born talented, others are born stupid; some are normal, others are 
disabled; some manage fine with their natural abilities, others will depend on systems of 
redistribution to compensate for their lack of natural assets. There seems to be an assumption 
here that individuals are fundamentally different and that some are fundamentally better (or at 
least better equipped) than the rest, and while this could be taken just as a statement of 
unfortunate fact, it sends a disturbingly contemptuous message to what Anderson sums up as ‘the 
disabled, the ugly and other victims of bad luck’. Though the intention is radical – that 
individuals should not be penalised for things that were beyond their control – the effect is more 
conservative. It is assumed that much of the inequality in the current distribution of resources 
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really does reflect differences in ability and talent, and the main challenge has been around 
questioning whether this process is fair. 
It is worth contrasting this to the rather different intuition that underpins Michael Walzer’s 
egalitarianism: what he describes as his ‘democratic wager’ that qualities and intelligences are 
roughly distributed across the population, that no-one has a monopoly of all desirable talents, and 
that everyone has something to offer (Walzer,1993). Where Walzer and Anderson start from a 
presumption that all individuals are worthy of equal respect - and that a systematic bunching of 
privileges around certain people must then derive from inequitable social structures - the attempt 
to differentiate the consequences of personal choice from what is just ‘brute’ bad luck too readily 
accepts that individuals really are unequally endowed by fortune. This gives far too much 
credence to the claims standardly made by the more successful that they got where they are by 
the exercise of superior talents. It also leaves the less successful in the category of those to be 
pitied and helped.  
The final point is that much of the work on economic equality treats structures of 
inequality as arising from the activities and choices of autonomous individuals. Luck and choice 
appear as the two main variables dictating the distribution of resources, and even when the luck 
element has a self-evidently group component (like the bad luck of being born black in a society 
that favours those who are white, or the bad luck of being born to working class parents), the 
emphasis on individual responsibility tends to play this down. The literature is full of examples 
designed to test our perceptions of justified and unjustified inequality: do we think it fair that the 
opera singer whose voice brings pleasure to millions is entitled to the rewards of her own good 
luck? do we think it fair that the person who plays tennis all day should get less than the 
neighbour who diligently grows vegetables in her garden? do we think surfers are entitled to a 
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basic income? The cumulative effect is to obscure those structural inequalities that cannot be 
understood in such individualist terms. In a world where the 300 wealthiest individuals control 
assets equivalent to those of the poorest three billion – or where top investment advisors can pick 
up bonuses of £3 million each – the distribution of resources is clearly about something more 
than either natural skills or propensity for hard work. And even at the more mundane and 
familiar level of inequality, the advantages that accrue to individuals almost always depend on a 
network of relationships that have allowed some to benefit from the disadvantages of others. The 
wealth of the household with two or more high earners is made possible not just by the 
combination of their individual talents and choices; it also depends on the low wages they are 
able to pay to their cleaners and nannies and gardeners. The wealth of a high-earning man is 
made possible not just by his combination of talents and ambitions; it may also depend on the 
availability of a non-earning wife who frees him from housework and childcare. The good luck 
of one individual often depends on the bad luck of another: inequality is relational and not just 
comparative.  
Most egalitarians will agree that inequality is structural, but in taking up the challenge set 
by the anti-egalitarian right they have become overly preoccupied with what Anderson describes 
as ‘the distribution of privately appropriated goods, such as income or resources, or privately 
enjoyed goods, such as welfare’ (1999, p288). Where, in this, are the social structures of 
oppression that are the more usual target of egalitarian political movements? Mostly in another 
part of the literature. As explorations of economic equality become more locked into a 
framework of individual comparison, the group component of inequality has migrated to a 
different set of debates. In contemporary normative theory, the patterns of oppression that 
subordinate one group to another are most commonly discussed within the framework of a 
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‘politics of difference’ or a ‘politics of recognition’; and the paradigmatic examples are not 
inequalities of class but inequalities between  women and  men, ethnic minorities and ethnic 
majorities. 
The key concept in this second literature is citizenship, the key question being whether 
equality of citizenship has to be premised on all groups becoming the same. In an earlier 
framework that took class as the paradigmatic case of group inequality, difference was conceived 
as a barrier to citizen equality: something that either had to be eliminated (as when socialists 
argued that citizens would not be treated as equals so long as they were so different in their 
income and power), or else disregarded (as when liberals argued that people should be treated as 
equals, despite any differences in income or wealth). In the debates that have subsequently 
dominated thinking on citizenship, the central concern has been how to detach equality from its 
perverse association with assimilation. How, for example, to ensure that liberal polities support 
rather than undermining the distinctive social identities that are often central to their citizens’ 
sense of worth? How to ensure that women’s entry into citizenship is not made conditional on 
their simulating ‘masculine’ activities and values? How to ensure that the citizenship of ethnic 
minority groups is not made conditional on them passing Norman Tebbit’s ‘cricket test’? How to 
ensure that the rights of indigenous peoples are not swept aside in phoney promises about 
incorporation into institutional arrangements favoured by victorious settlers? Those contributing 
to this work come from a variety of normative traditions (and are far more internally diverse than 
those working on economic equality) but representative writings include Young (1990), Taylor 
(1992), Kymlicka (1995), Tully (1995), Lister (1997) and recent collections edited by Benhabib 
(1996), and Lukes and Joppke (1999). The Canadian influence is strong, reflecting a complex of 
political issues around multiculturalism, the status of Quebec, and the self-government demands 
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of indigenous peoples. The impact of feminism is also notable, reflecting what is by now a long 
history of discussion on the relationship between equality and difference. 
The contrast between these two bodies of literature maps onto to what is widely described 
as a distinction between redistribution and recognition, though the deeper division, in my view, 
is between those who see inequality as a relationship between individuals and those who see it as 
a relationship between groups. Nancy Fraser (1997) has written of a tension between a 
redistributive politics that centres on socioeconomic injustices like exploitation, poverty or 
unemployment, and a recognition politics that addresses the status injuries done to people when 
they are subjected to stereotypical representations of their own culture or forced to subordinate 
themselves to the self-understandings of a dominant group. Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth 
(1995) come readily to mind as major figures in the development of a politics of recognition, 
both of them arguing that the non-recognition of one’s distinctive identity is a form of oppression 
that can profoundly injure one’s sense of oneself. Nobody particularly springs to mind, however, 
as an exemplar of Fraser’s politics of redistribution, for her definition already assumes a more 
structural analysis of economic inequality - ‘having the fruits of one’s labour appropriated for the 
benefit of others’, ‘being confined to undesirable or poorly paidwork’ (Fraser, 1997, p13) – than 
is evident in current work on economic distribution. What is clear, however, is that the two 
streams of thought now run largely in isolation from one another, so that analyses of economic 
inequality proceed untouched by any thoughts on diversity and difference while analyses of the 
conditions for equal citizenship barely engage with economic concerns. 
This bifurcation in the literature is deeply unfortunate. Normative work on economic 
equality runs the risk of detachment from the pressing concerns of contemporary egalitarian 
politics (which must surely include the problems of racial and sexual domination, and how to 
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deal with the equality claims of minority ethnic and religious groups), while challenging new 
work on what it means for different groups to participate as equals in civil society risks 
forgetting that there are economic conditions for this. One of the central themes to emerge out of 
the literature on the politics of difference is that we have to fashion our understanding of equality 
to the plural nature of contemporary societies – seeking equality in heterogeneity, and maybe in 
differential rights for differently situated groups rather than making all groups the same. While 
this rightly alerts us to the complexities of equality, it can also shift attention from the starker 
disadvantages of income and wealth.  
 Sometimes, indeed, it seems that the critique of assimilation has generated a distrust of 
any kind of convergence, and that an entirely legitimate argument about equality being 
compatible with difference leads into a disregard for differences that really should be removed. It 
would clearly be absurd to suggest that divergent belief-systems should be brought together by 
halving the difference or that cultural convergence is the only basis for cultural equality. But it is 
not so absurd to suggest that equality between the sexes depends on ending the continuing 
segregation between male and female occupations and roles, or that equality between rich and 
poor depends on reducing the gap.  Some differences are indeed incompatible with equality, and 
many of the economic differences fall precisely into this camp. (For a fuller development of this 
argument, see Phillips, 1999.) One of the problems signalled by the work of Fraser and others is 
that too exclusive an emphasis on recognition claims can mitigate the continuing urgency of 
redistribution. One of my hopes for the future is that normative theory will restore the balance 




2. Pluralism and the Universality of Norms 
The importance attached to cultural pluralism also feeds into debates about universalism and 
cultural particularism. The status of liberalism is central here. Liberalism attaches a high priority 
to the freedom of the individual, is inclined to rate the claims of the individual above the claims 
of any community, and tends be tolerant of difference, so long as the differences are conceived 
as matters of private concern. These principles are not, however, universally shared. If we take 
the major world religions (not to mention the major secular divides) there is clearly considerable 
disagreement on the importance of individual liberty, on what counts as a matter of private 
conscience, or when the claims of the individual can be subordinated to wider community 
concerns. How, then, can liberals legitimately insist on ‘their’ principles as the right ones? 
Liberals often pride themselves on their tolerance and even-handedness, but there is a danger that 
the very impartiality associated with liberalism conceals a favouritism towards the liberal point 
of view. 
 Through much of the 1980s, debate on this proceeded through an opposition between 
liberal and communitarian theory, the first associated with norms that were universal but 
relatively anodyne, the second with norms that were more substantive but linked to particular 
social contexts. In the paradigmatic liberal position (usually identified, though arguably 
mis-identified, with the early work of John Rawls), norms of justice were derived from a thought 
experiment that assumed individuals to be rational creatures intent on their own self-interest. 
Self-interest in isolation might encourage us to support policies that simply favoured our own 
kind: thus the rich would be against high taxes, while the poor would want better social 
provision. But if we could additionally set aside what we know about our current position in 
society – including what we know about our desires and values and goals – we could be brought 
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to recognise the rationality of principles of justice that would be sufficiently favourable to each. 
If we did not know, for example, whether we were going to inherit wealth and talent, whether we 
were going to prefer opera to rock music, whether we were going to be atheists or Muslims or 
Jews, we would converge on principles of tolerance and moderate redistribution that could 
satisfy us whatever we turned out to be. 
 The resulting principles would tend towards neutrality on most substantive moral issues – 
and to that extent be rather empty of content – but they would have the great advantage of being 
universal in scope. In the paradigmatic communitarian alternative, it makes no sense to think of 
individuals outside their social and cultural contexts, for it is precisely those social practices and 
cultural traditions that are the source of normative value. Because of this, however, it also makes 
little sense to think of values as universally applicable wherever people happen to be. Instead of 
pursuing principles and procedures that will be sufficiently abstract to apply to any community in 
and historical context, communitarian theorists then see values as formed through the shared 
understandings of particular societies and communities. This position is usually identified with 
the work of Charles Taylor, Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel and Michael Walzer, though 
again there is a question of mis-identification, since none of these has adopted the label of 
communitarian theorist. Mulhall and Swift (1992) provide one of the best overviews of these 
debates.  
 Positions on these issues have been further complicated by the impact of 
post-structuralism and post-modernism, which offers a parallel critique of moral universalism but 
usually wants nothing to do with invocations of ‘the community’; and the influence of feminism, 
which has developed its own objections to liberal contractarianism (eg. Pateman, 1988; Young, 
1990), but sees much communitarian theory as deeply conservative (see the argument in Frazer 
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and Lacey, 1993). Feminists have sometimes found themselves in uneasy alliance with 
communitarians because of a shared dissatisfaction with the individualism that characterises 
liberal thinking, and a shared distrust (though for different reasons) of universalism, which many 
feminists have come to view as a trick of the patriarchal trade. Alternatively, some feminists 
have aligned themselves with post-modernism, which offers a sceptical perspective on the 
meta-narratives of modernity and the pretensions of universal thought (see essays in Nicholson 
(ed) 1990).  
 Richard Rorty's attack on foundationalist thinking (1989) has had an astonishing degree 
of success – so much so that debates staged on such topics as whether democracy needs 
foundations tend to fizzle out when no-one is prepared to defend a strongly foundationalist 
position. Rorty’s cheerful ethno-centrism still raises hackles, but his central point about the 
emptiness of claiming that our values are grounded in either nature or reason has resonated more 
widely, and even those most committed to the universalism of their ethical principles have 
registered difficulties in establishing their case. The most common retort is that political 
radicalism will be diminished if people cannot appeal to some independent foundation as their 
basis for criticising practices they find abhorrent, if they cannot establish some vantage point 
outside. This is, in my view, an incoherent objection, for even if removing what were once 
conceived as sure foundations for moral or political belief did condemn one to political 
impotence, it is hard to see what would follow. We can hardly stake the universality of our 
principles on the fear of what would happen if we abandoned this claim. The case against 
foundationalism cannot be countered by arguments of an instrumental nature, for if ever the 
'preference' for firm foundations is revealed as such (we 'need' universal principles, we 'need' a 
secure vantage point from outside), the case collapses on itself. We cannot appeal to the 
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consequences as the basis for returning to foundationalist thinking; the only basis for this return 
would be the knowledge of sure foundations. 
 Debates that began in an opposition between atomistic and socially embedded views of 
the individual have become increasingly linked to issues of cultural pluralism and the limits of 
liberalism in dealing with illiberal cultures or groups. This is one of the themes taken up in the 
collection edited by John Horton and Susan Mendus on Toleration, Identity and Difference 
(1999), which explores the implications of identity politics for the core liberal principle of 
toleration. Liberalism has come under fire for failing to address the recognition claims of diverse 
cultural groups – for pretending to a neutrality that is in truth loaded against minority groups. 
There has also been a reaction against this in some recent feminist literature, which restates 
liberalism as central to the concerns of sexual equality (Moller Okin, 1998; Nussbaum, 1999).  
But as Richard Bellamy usefully notes, setting up the issue as a tension between liberalism and 
multiculturalism is not always helpful, for ‘the multicultural perspective unwittingly reinforces a 
widespread liberal prejudice that pluralist objections to liberalism derive solely from illiberal 
throwbacks miraculously marooned in the modern world.’(1999,p3) Yet those challenges to the 
liberal hegemony that have come from cultural and ethnic minorities querying the uniform 
imposition of one set of values on a diversity of identities and groups are best understood as 
claims made in the name of equality. To that extent, they are claims made in the name of what 
are supposed to be good liberal principles – rather than claims that emanate from somewhere 
outside. 
There have been a number of responses to the combined onslaught from communitarianism 
and post-modern anti-foundationalism, and among the most currently influential are those that 
stress the interaction of actual (no longer abstract) individuals in the formulation of principles 
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and norms. This approach detaches the defence of universalism from any lingering taint of 
foundationalism, and while continuing to regard norms as universal rather than contextual,  
treats these norms as justified by reference to the conditions under which they are produced. One 
variant of this, much influenced by Scanlon’s essay on ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism’ 
(1982), considers what principles reasonable and reasonably well-informed persons might come 
to agree on if they were operating in conditions of equal power. Rather than thinking of 
individuals as abstracted from their social contexts, this takes it for granted that people know a 
great deal about themselves and others in their society. Indeed in Brian Barry’s version (1994), it 
is precisely this knowledge that makes them aware of the fallibility of any ’truth’ claims. The 
presumption of equality (all citizens being regarded as equals) then combines with scepticism 
(no-one being able to establish with certainty that his or her beliefs are the right ones) to generate 
impartiality as the central - and in Barry’s argument, most definitely universal - rule of justice. 
Reasonable people will recognise that if they object to policies that favour another group or 
another set of beliefs over their own, then others may reasonably make the same objection. To 
put this the other way round, it is only if people unreasonably believe they have a monopoly on 
truth or that their interests matter more than those of others that they would claim the right to 
impose their own interests or views.  
 What is notable about this is that it moves from the abstracted individual of Rawls’ 
original position to a society of actual people. Normative principles then arise out of our 
relationships to one another. The stronger version of this – associated with notions of 
deliberative or communicative democracy - addresses more seriously the processes through 
which people engage with one another’s point of view. Appeals to reasonableness alone are risky 
and potentially flawed, for there is always a question about what might have been smuggled into 
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the notion of reasonableness, and always an issue about who decides what counts as a reasonable 
objection. Barry’s version of reasonable agreement does presume real people, but it still proceeds 
through private processes of  reasoned argument (we each of us argue with ourselves), and this 
leaves the more suspicious reader wondering whether Barry’s notion of what is reasonable will 
coincide with anyone’s else’s. In contrast to this, those working within a framework of 
deliberative democracy (representative examples range across Manin, 1987; Cohen, 1989; 
Miller, 1993; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, Habermas, 1996) focus attention on the dialogue 
between individuals and groups, arguing that the legitimacy of norms depends on the unforced 
agreement of all the relevant groups. 
In deliberative versions of democracy, just decisions can only be arrived at through 
procedures that are fair and transparent and allow for maximum engagement with competing 
perspectives. The intuition underpinning this is that the partiality of each perspective will emerge 
through its exposure to others, and that the public engagement with different experiences and 
arguments – which deepen understanding of the available political choices and alert participants 
to the legitimacy of different claims – will then enable people to arrive at their principles of 
justice. Some theorists (most notably Habermas) retain a strongly 'Enlightenment' notion of the 
universal principles that can be arrived at under ideal conditions, while others are more cautious 
about the permanent contestation that is implied in radical difference. In all versions, equality 
and publicity figure as the central conditions, for the deliberation that peremptorily excludes 
particular values or arguments or perspectives cannot be expected to produce the desired results.  
 Taken as a theory about how democracies should organise themselves, deliberative 
democracy often looks hopelessly utopian – too far a cry from the professionalisation of 
contemporary politics and the passivity of the modern citizenry. But taken as a theory about the 
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basis for normative judgements, it has the undoubted merit of building pluralism and difference 
into the very constitution of our values and norms. So where a rights-based understanding of 
democracy might draw up an a priori list of fundamental rights, deliberative democracy is more 
likely to stress the importance of intercultural dialogue in the formulation of central principles. 
And where invocations of reasonableness might ‘implicitly prejudice the agenda in favour of an 
inherited background of settled traditions’ (Habermas,1996, p309), a deliberative understanding 
of democracy makes us more sensitive to the claims of those perceived as ’wild’ or ‘anarchic’ or 
in some way beyond the pale. It is for this reason, mainly, that there has been such feminist 
interest in deliberative democracy. 
In the shift from rationality to reasonableness to substantive processes of dialogue and 
debate, normative theorists might be said to be challenging starker oppositions between 
normative and empirical considerations, and taking more seriously the political and institutional 
framework out of which moral norms emerge. In most versions, however, this is still just a 
promissory note. On the crucial point of equality, in particular, much of the work on deliberative 
democracy remains gestural. Theorists typically insist that the validity of normative judgements 
depends on the free and equal access of all those likely to be affected by decisions, but do not 
usually bother too much about how to make sure that this occurs. Yet failing more sustained 
efforts to ensure that all voices are equally and fairly heard, deliberative models of democracy 
become little more than a pious attachment to informed over ill-informed decisions, or a belief in 
the power of discussion as making possible solutions that were impossible. As such, they risk 
declining into little more than glorified common-sense. 
 It is at this point that we can most usefully identify some differences between the British 
and American traditions. The first hint of difference is that the lingering resonance of Marxism in 
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British political debate means that British theorists are more pre-occupied than their North 
American counterparts with economic and material equality. They have been less willing to 
endorse the shift of emphasis from problems of economic distribution to problems of cultural 
recognition (see Graham, 1999; Baker, 1999; Phillips, 1999); and even if debates in Britain 
sometimes seem too close a replay of Canadian pre-occupations with Quebec and the rights of 
aboriginal peoples or US pre-occupations with multiculturalism in the university curriculum, 
there has also been resistance to this. 
 British theorists also seem marginally more at ease with the interplay between normative 
and empirical work, and tend to regard empirical plausibility as of equal significance alongside 
theoretical rigour. This is a self-conscious strategy both in David Beetham’s work on democracy 
and in Richard Bellamy’s recent book on Liberalism and Pluralism (1999).  Bellamy develops 
a case for ‘negotiated compromise’ as his alternative to the liberal trimmers (who go for 
universalism but at the cost of restricting themselves to the least controversial issues) or the 
communitarian segregators (who get more substance into their normative principles but at the 
cost of restricting themselves to particular societies or cultures). In Bellamy’s approach , the key 
point about value pluralism is that it exists between particular people in particular circumstances. 
It is when those people embark on processes of negotiation and compromise (when they get 
stuck into ‘real’ politics), that the nature of their conflicts is clarified and  - sometimes - 
resolved. This puts more flesh onto what have seemed rather high-flown images of deliberation, 
and Bellamy pursues his argument through such examples as the incorporation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights into British law, and the competing conceptions of European 
citizenship that could underpin the development of the European Union.  
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 It would be misleading, however, to conclude that British normative theory is therefore 
characterised by a greater sensitivity to ‘real-life’ politics or displays a greater commitment to 
economic equality. In normative theory, it has been more common to contrast an 
Anglo-American with a Continental European tradition, the first hugely influenced by the work 
of Rawls, the second by the critical theory tradition currently represented by Habermas or the 
very different post-structuralism associated with Michel Foucault. (This distinction is not to be 
confused with location, for some of the leading exponents of critical theory currently work in 
North America, while the ideas of French or German theorists are often refracted back to Britain 
via the USA.) It is not easy – and is perhaps in the end pointless – to mark out a ‘European’ or 
‘British’ tradition as distinct from developments in the USA; and the difficulties surrounding 
such attempts are increased by the growing interchange between these traditions. Many have 
commented on the greater accessibility of Habermas’ Between Facts and Norms. This is partly 
because it is more grounded in political and legal theory than his earlier more sociological work; 
but it also reflects Habermas’s increasing engagement with Anglo-American theory as 
represented by Rawls, Dworkin, Bruce Ackerman or Cass Sunstein.  
 The unifying point, across America and Europe alike, has been the collapse of socialism 
as a viable political project, and the impact this has had on the evolution of normative thought. 
Many of the older oppositions that characterised debate have been reformulated, previously 
under-theorised issues have come to the fore, and new energy has been unleashed on assessments 
of the liberal tradition. Normative theory is very much alive and kicking – but I do wish it would 
kick a bit harder against persistent and growing inequality. 
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